Discontinuous games, such as auctions, may require special tie-breaking rules to guarantee equilibrium existence. The best results available ensure equilibrium existence only in mixed strategy with endogenously defined tie-breaking rules and communication of private information. We show that an all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in a class of auctions. The rule is explicitly defined and does not require communication of private information. We also characterize when special tie-breaking rules are really needed.
i.e., the bidder i receives the object if b i > b (−i) and none if b i < b (−i) . If the tie-breaking rule is not explicitly mentioned, we assume that ties (b i = b (−i) ) are broken by the standard tie-breaking rule, that is, the object is randomly divided among the tying bidders. More specifically, the payoff of bidder i is given by
where v (t i , t −i ) is the value of the object for bidder i, p W and p L are the payments made in the events of winning and losing, respectively, and m(b) is the number of tying bidders. Our setting is given by the following assumptions: 4 The example 2 in subsection 3.2 embeds example 1 of JSSZ in a class of parametrized examples. By "a close example" we mean a neighborhood of the parameters that specify their example. 5 The model can be easily extended to L < N homogenous objects, if each bidder's demand is unitary. 6 In section 3, we consider only the case S = [0, 1] ⊂ R and N = 2. In section 5, we comment on how these assumptions can be relaxed.
Assumption 1 Types are independently distributed in
, where µ is the marginal distribution for the type of each bidder. Players are risk neutrals and the value of the object for player i is given by v (t i , t −i ), where the function v : S × S N −1 → R + is measurable, its range is the compact interval [v, v] ⊂ R + and it is symmetric in the last N −1 arguments, that is, if t 0 −i is a permutation of t −i , v
is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
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The most restrictive requirement of Assumption 1 is symmetry, although independence is also restrictive. However, available results on pure strategy equilibrium existence are restricted to independency or affiliation. We only consider symmetric pure strategy equilibria (not necessarily monotonic). On the other hand, note that Assumption 1 does not require any kind of monotonicity and, thus, generalizes, in this direction, assumptions usually required in auction models.
The specific auction format is determined by p W and p L . We will alternatively consider two cases. The first one, embodied in Assumption 2-(i) below, covers first-price auctions and all-pay auctions, for instance. The second case, defined by Assumption 2-(ii), covers second-price auctions, among other exotic formats.
for all b and b 0 and one of the two conditions below is satisfied: An active reserve price, that is, b min that excludes some bidders is dealt with in the Appendix. However, for a simple statement of the results, we restrict our exposition to the case where the reserve price is not active, as summarized by the following assumption:
W , p L and b min are such that no bidder plays b OUT , that is, no bidder prefers to stay out of the auction.
We denote the auction described above by A = (S, Σ, µ, N, v). Observe that we are considering only symmetric auctions. Thus, throughout the paper, when we refer to a strategy or to a profile of strategies, we always mean symmetric pure strategies.
Pure strategy monotonic equilibria for non-monotonic auctions
Our first aim is to characterize the conditions under which there exist symmetric monotonic equilibria in a setting where the payoff functions are not necessarily monotonic. For all results of this section, we consider an auction A = (S, Σ, µ, N, v) satisfying assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and such that N = 2 (there are only 2 players) and S = [0, 1] ⊂ R. Let us denote by p (β, b) the expected payment of a bidder that plays a bid β, when the opponent is playing an increasing strategy b : [0, 1] → R in the auction A, that is,
The first useful result that we derive is the Revenue Equivalence Theorem for our setting.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 6 in the Appendix.
We also have the following:
is a strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium of A, then Assumption 2-(i) implies that b is differentiable and
while Assumption 2-(ii) implies that b is continuous and
Proof. The first part is a consequence of Proposition 4, while the second part is a consequence of Proposition 5 in the Appendix.
For the four previously mentioned formats, the function b that satisfies (1) is given by:
It is easy to see that each of these functions is increasing if v is non-decreasing in both arguments. Nevertheless, since we do not assume such monotonicity, this is not necessarily true in our setting. This observation will be important below.
Recall that Assumption 2-(ii) requires that
Thus, if v is continuous, as required by Proposition 2, then (3) always has a solution, by the Intermediate Value Theorem. However, the existence of b does not imply its monotonicity. Under Assumption 2-(i), we might impose extra conditions to ensure the existence of a solution to (2), i.e., the existence of b satisfying (1).
The next theorem provides an extra necessary weak monotonicity condition on v for the existence of a monotonic equilibrium. It turns out that this condition is sufficient to guarantee that an increasing bidding function b satisfying the payment expression (1) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Characterization) Suppose that v is continuous. There exists a symmetric monotonic equilibrium without ties with positive probability if and only if (i) there exists a strictly increasing continuous function b that satisfies the payment expression (1);
In the affirmative case, the function b in item (i) is an equilibrium of A. If v is not continuous, the above conditions are still sufficient and (ii) is necessary. Proof. Proposition 1 shows that (i) is necessary. The necessity of (ii) and the sufficiency part are shown by Corollary 1 in the Appendix.
The condition (ii) of Theorem 1 is a weak monotonicity condition since (8) 
The condition that b satisfying (1) is increasing is a condition on the primitives of the problem and it is straightforward to check for specific auction formats. For instance, in the case of a first-price auction we have only to check whether the function given by (5) is increasing. The same is valid for all-pay auctions (4), second-price auctions (6) and war of attrition (7) . The verification is not straightforward only when (2) or (3) have no close form solution. Subsection 3.2 will treat cases where b satisfying (1) is not increasing.
An example
In Example 1 below, condition (8) is not satisfied and there is no monotonic equilibrium. In the Appendix we reparametrize the types of Example 1 such that Theorem 1 is satisfied for the new types. The equilibrium bidding function is not then monotonic in the original types.
Example 1 Consider a symmetric first-price auction between two bidders with independent and uniformly distributed types in [0, 1]. The payoff function is
It is easy to verify that b given by (5) is increasing, but the necessary condition (8) is not satisfied, because
for x > y. By Theorem 1, there is no monotonic equilibrium. However, in the Appendix we show that the following continuous and bell-shaped bidding function is an equilibrium:
Example 1 shows that sometimes only non-monotonic equilibria are possible. Thus, natural questions arise: when only increasing equilibria exist and when equilibria exist at all (possibly with non-monotonic strategies). The last question will be tackled in section 5, while the former is treated in the sequel.
Monotonic equilibria and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
The assumption that follows is weaker than the usual assumption of the auction theory which requires in addition that v is also non-decreasing on y. For the results of this subsection we assume that Assumption 4 also holds.
Assumption 4 For all y ∈ S, x 7 → v (x, y) is increasing.
As we observed before the statement of Theorem 1, Assumption 4 implies (8). Thus, under Assumption 4, the existence result below is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1. Less obvious is the converse part that states that all equilibria must be increasing. 
is increasing only if β > −1. Thus, there is an equilibrium without ties if and only if β > −1, provided that α > max {0, − (1 + β) /2, −β} (otherwise, there would exist negative values).
Example 2 is used by JSSZ to show that the equilibrium may fail to exist under the standard tie-breaking rule. Building on this example, they propose an endogenously defined tie-breaking rule to ensure equilibrium existence in general.
Let us consider instead the exogenous all-pay auction tie-breaking rule: if a tie occurs, conduct an all-pay auction among the tying bidders. If another tie occurs, split the object evenly. The payments of the tying bidders are made according to the second-stage bids. Our all-pay auction tie-breaking rule has the role of the second-price auction tie-breaking rule used by Maskin and Riley (2001) .
The next theorem shows that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule always ensures equilibrium existence for the auctions we are considering. It is also important to note that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule does not require announcement of types. 9 Theorem 3 (Equilibrium Existence with Ties) Assume that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is adopted. If there is b that satisfies the payment expression (1), then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium. Proof. This follows from the proof of Theorem 6.
The function b satisfying the statement of Theorem 3 is an equilibrium only if it is increasing. If not, we can modify b into a non-decreasing bidding function with a positive-probability set of tying types.
One important ingredient in the proof of Theorem 3 is that the bidding function of an all-pay auction
is always increasing (since v is positive by Assumption 1) and gives exactly the expected payment (1) . Any other auction that has an increasing bidding equilibrium, like the all-pay auction or war of attrition, can be used as the tie-breaking mechanism.
Example 2 (continuation) For β 6 −1, the equilibrium of Example 2 is given by a constant bidding function b 1 (x) =b for the first price auction, whereb ∈ h α + 1+β 2 , α i , and the bidding function
for the (all-pay) auction tie-breaking rule.¥
Tournaments
When b is not increasing, types are not "correctly" ordered and b fails to conveniently reveal the bidder's information. The tie-breaking rule plays exactly the role of sorting the types. Thus, Theorem 3 shows that all-pay and war-of-attrition auctions are better-revealing information mechanisms than first-price and second-price auctions.
An important example of all-pay auctions is tournament. Our previous theorem thus gives a justification for the practice of tournaments. Consider, for instance, the case of research contest among researchers who have a vector of unobserved characteristics, like technical capabilities, discipline, honesty, creativity, etc. In such cases the object value is usually a very intricate function of these characteristics and tournaments (allpay auctions) can perform better the task of revealing this multidimensional information. Thus, tournaments are most expected in situations where the determination of the best competitor is more complex.
Standard explanations for the use of tournaments in research contest also appeal to the role of information. Taylor (1995, p. 872) says that: "Contracting for research is often infeasible because research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by a court". Our point is somewhat different but related to this. The novelty is the comparison between auction mechanisms with respect to information revelation.
That all-pay auctions are better mechanisms to reveal information is not completely new. Fullerton and McAfee (1999) observe that all-pay auction implies the existence of an increasing equilibrium in a setting where the second-price auction does not. They analyze the auction for the right to compete in a tournament -see our section 4 for more explanation. Their results, including the proofs, are restricted to their model, which is a particular case of ours. Thus, Theorem 3 extends their basic intuition and shows that the property of better-revealing information can be used to define an effective tie-breaking rule that does not require announcement of types.
Multiplicity of equilibria
An interesting corollary of Theorem 3 is the possibility of multiple equilibria when b is not increasing, even under Assumption 4. There are two sources for this multiplicity. The first is due to the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule per se, since many bid levels can be chosen as the tying bid. This is shown in Figure 1 : any level b 0 between z 0 and z 1 can be chosen in the interval where b is decreasing and gives the same expected payment and payoff to each bidder in the auction. The second source is the fact that the tie-breaking rule is not unique in general. For instance, for some specifications of v there are cases where b is decreasing with many tie-breaking rules that ensure equilibrium existence (see Example 1 of JSSZ). However, these tie-breaking rules may result in different expected revenues, whereas the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule always preserves the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
Non-monotonicities in multidimensional auctions
In JSSZ the action and type spaces are compact and metric and no monotonicity condition is imposed on the utility functions. Thus, the need of special tie-breaking rules has to be understood in a more general setup. Nevertheless, theoretical generality is not the only motivation. Even if we restrict ourselves to auctions, there are meaningful and interesting situations where the usual monotonic assumptions are too restrictive.
An interesting example occurs when the private information is not directly related to the object value. For instance, the private information can be the financial constraints of the bidder. In this case, the utility functions are not necessarily increasing with the private information. Indeed, Zheng (2001) consider a case where the private information is the financial capacity of the bidder and non-monotonic equilibria can arise (see his remark 3.2, p. 157).
The possibility of private information not directly related to value is, per se, a motivation to consider models where the utility function is not necessarily monotonic. But, even if it is directly related to the value, non-monotonicities can also arise. Consider the following:
Example 3 (Job Market) Let us model the job market for a potential manager as an auction between two competing firms where the object is the job contract. It is natural to assume that managers have a multidimensional vector of characteristics, m = (m 1 , ..., m k ). For simplicity, we consider only one-dimensional characteristics. The qualification appraisal of the job candidate is private information of the competing firms. Each firm has just one position with a specific characteristic requirement. In general, for specific jobs firms have a desirable level of a specific characteristic. To give a concrete example, if the characteristic is experience, an experienced candidate can be rejected for a junior position. 10 Therefore, let d i be such a desirable level. Thus, the utility of the firms in this auction is modeled as
where a is the weight of the managers' characteristic and b > 0 is the penalty of the distance from the desired level d i . It is clear that this utility may be non-monotonic in the types. For some values of the constants, it is also possible that all equilibria are non-mononotic (a proof of this last claim is available upon request).
Another example where non-monotonicities arise is when the object is the right to compete in a research tournament analyzed by Fullerton and McAfee (1999) . The private information is the cost of conducting research. The probability of winning the tournament is decreasing with own cost, but increasing with the opponents'. It turns out that the object value (the right to participate in the tournament) has the same feature. Thus, the standard assumption that the bidders' private informations are monotonic in the same direction is not fulfilled.
Non-monotonicities also arise as consequence of multidimensional and complex information. For instance, in an oil lease auction, the private information of bidders includes estimates of the track size, oil quality, extraction cost, future international prices, etc. These variables may compound in a non-monotonic fashion: small firms have larger costs to operate big tracts compared to big firms, but the reverse is true if the track size is small. Some of these variables are private values (such as the extraction cost), but others (such as the field size or international oil price) are common value and the assessments of the opponents are likely to be important. Putting all these together, it is not surprising that non-monotonicities arise in such multidimensional setting. 11 We described cases where the value functions may be non-monotonic because of multidimensionality of types. On the other hand, an example of Reny and Zamir (2004) shows that multidimensionality and correlation of types may lead to nonmonotonic equilibria, even if the value functions are monotonic. In their example, there are three bidders with bidimensional affiliated signals and monotonic value functions, but all equilibria are non-monotonic.
Multidimensionality is also a source of non-monotonicities through a different channel. Athey and Levin (2001) and Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) consider single-object auctions where bids are multidimensional (although the information is unidimensional). Athey and Levin (2001) analyze the U.S. Forest Service timber auction where bids are the unit prices of each specie of timber. Before the auction the Forest Service (auctioneer) estimates the quantity of each specie in the tract and publicly announces them. Thus, the auctioneer receives the multidimensional bid or the "supply" curve and obtains the bidders' scores multiplying the submitted unit prices by the announced quantities. The highest score bidder is the winner. Nevertheless, the actual price paid by the winner is obtained by multiplying his unit price by the actual number of removed trees, which are verified ex-post by the Forest Service. Thus, a bidder who makes a better estimative of the number of trees of each specie and knows that the initial estimate of the Forest Service is not accurate, may strategically manipulate his offer. As a result, non-monotonic bids can arise.
A similar situation (see Ewerhart and Fieseler (2003) ) is a procurement auction for a service with equipment supply such that bidders should put prices on materials and work hours. Again, a scoring rule determines the winner through the seller's initial estimative (of materials and work hours). The final payment is made according to the actual use of materials and work hours. Again strategic manipulation of bids leads to non-monotonic bidding functions.
All these examples show the importance of considering auctions with relaxed monotonicity assumptions. In the next section, we analyze the multidimensional type space and bidding functions that may not be monotonic. For this setting, we obtain results analogous to those found in section 3 for monotonic unidimensional auctions. However, the characterization is not totally complete as in the previous case, as we explain below.
Extension to multidimensional auctions
In this section we discuss how the results of section 3 can be extended to N players and multidimensional type space S, which can be, for instance, a universal type space in the sense of Mertens and Zamir (1986) . We consider strategies b : S → R that induce ties with zero probability but are not necessarily monotonic even if S has a natural order, as in the case of S ⊂ R. This will allow us to characterize when this kind of equilibria does not exist and ties are unavoidable. The set S is formed by functions b that do not induce ties with positive probability (because F b is absolutely continuous) and that do not have gaps in the support of bids (because F b is increasing). Observe that S contains non-monotonic bidding functions. As a first step, we will restrict attention to symmetric equilibria (b, ..., b) ∈ S N . For brevity and with some abuse of notation, we refer to such equilibria as b ∈ S.
As in section 3, our purpose is to characterize conditions on v such that a pure strategy equilibrium b ∈ S exists. Before the statement of the result we make some observations. If b ∈ S is an equilibrium, then the c.d.f. of the opponents' maximum bid,P :
is increasing since b is regular. Defineb ≡P −1 and P =P • b, so that P : S → [0, 1] is a reparametrization of the types in S satisfying
Therefore, P associates to each type her winning probability given b ∈ S. As we show in the Appendix, this reparametrization has some interesting properties. In particular, b =b • P is such that the (increasing) functionb is an equilibrium bidding function of a reduced auction with only two players, types P (s) ∈ [0, 1] and utility given byṽ
where P (−i) (t −i ) ≡ max j6 =i P (t j ). Thus, we can consider instead the auction e A = ³S ,Σ,μ,Ñ,ṽ´, wherẽ
,Σ is the Borel σ-field,μ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1],Ñ = 2 andṽ defined by (11) for a reparametrization P . The relation between auctions e A and A is explained by Proposition 8 in the Appendix. 12 We have an analogous version of Theorem 1:
Theorem 4 There exists a symmetric equilibrium in regular strategies for A if and only if there exists a reparametrization P : S → [0, 1] such that:
(i) there exists a strictly increasing and continuous functionb : [0, 1] → R satisfying the payment expression (1) forṽ given by (11) using the reparametrization P ;
(ii) for all (x, y)
In the affirmative case, the functionb is an equilibrium of e A.
The main difference between Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 is that the former does not need any reparametrization. In fact, Theorem 1 is a special case of
In fact, this is sufficient for equilibrium existence for e A but is not sufficient for equilibrium existence for A. To ensure equilibrium existence for A, we need to ensure that each type s satisfying P (s) = x, should not have an incentive for deviation. Thus, we need to specify the above inequality for each of these s and not only for the reparametrized type x. This explain our definition ofv, which depends directly on s. It turns out that (12) implies (13) , but the converse does not hold in general.
Theorem 4 implies that, if there exists an equilibrium, we have an outcome-equivalent auction e A with just 2 players and types uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. In other words, a multidimensional auction with an equilibrium can always be reduced to a simple unidimensional auction preserving some of the properties of the original one. This reinforces our interest in the auctions considered in section 3: they are the outcomeequivalent auction of the multi-player and multidimensional auction considered in this section.
Note that Theorem 4 does not make trivial the task of verifying whether an equilibrium exists for a given auction A, as Theorem 1 does for monotonic equilibria. Indeed, given a reparametrization P : S → [0, 1], in general, it is trivial to check whether conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. The non-trivial part is exactly to find which reparametrization works. Although we do not have a general method to find the reparametrization, the following proposition might be useful: for all s ∈ S such that P (s) = x, theñ
whereṽ is defined by (11) .
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This proposition can be used to compute explicitly the reparametrization, as the following example illustrates.
Example 4 Consider a symmetric first-price auction between two bidders with independent and uniformly distributed types in [0, 1]. The utility function is given by v(x, y) = x + α (x) y, where α (x) = 3 − 4x + 2x 2 .
Thus, ∂ x v(x, y) can be negative. Although
does not hold (for instance, take x = 0 and y = 1). Theorem 1 implies that there is no monotonic equilibrium for A. Nevertheless, in the Appendix, we illustrate how to use Proposition 3 to construct a U-shaped symmetric equilibrium where ties occur with zero probability.
Completely ordered auctions
Now we present the analogous version of Theorem 2 for this setting. First, we need a generalization of Assumption 4:
When S = [0, 1] , Assumption 5 is strictly weaker than Assumption 4, which is already a generalization of the standard assumptions of the auction theory. However, this does not mean that Assumption 5 is weak in multidimensional settings and, indeed, it can be quite restrictive. To see this, consider the functionv (s) ≡ E t −i [v (s, t −i )] and the natural complete order in S induced by it: s 0 < s ⇔v (s 0 ) ≥v (s). Under Assumption 5, this order is equivalent to s
Thus, there is a unique way to define the reparametrization under Assumption 5:
i.e., it is the winning probability with respect to that order. However, as in the case of Assumption 4, Assumption 5 does not imply equilibrium existence. Theorem 5 below (a generalization of Theorem 2) shows thatb satisfying the payment expression (1) and being an increasing function is sufficient, under Assumption 5.
Theorem 5 (Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Equilibrium Existence)
Consider an auction A satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5. Let P be defined by (15) andṽ by (11) for this P . Ifṽ is continuous, then there exists b ∈ S an equilibrium for A if and only if there exists an increasing functionb that satisfies (1) forṽ. In the affirmative case, the equilibrium of A is given by b =b • P . If there is a uniqueb that satisfies such a property, the equilibrium of A is also unique in S. Ifṽ is not continuous, the condition is still sufficient.
As commented after Theorem 4, multidimensional auctions with regular equilibria can always be reduced (through reparametrizations) to unidimensional auctions. Thus, to prove equilibrium existence for multidimensional auctions, it suffices to "reduce" them to unidimensional auctions. This reduction is not an easy task in general, but it is trivial under Assumption 5 because types can be ordered in a unique and natural way. 14 Under Assumption 5, the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule also works. We then have a simple generalization of Theorem 3.
14 The reduction type dimension is not a novelty in auction theory. Studying efficient auctions, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) use a close condition to Assumption 5 and Jehiel, et al. (1996) make such reduction for revenue maximization.
Theorem 6 (Equilibrium Existence with Ties)
Consider an auction A where the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is adopted. If there is an absolutely continuous functionb that satisfies (1), then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium.
Conclusion
Simon and Zame (1990) and JSSZ proposed a solution to the problem of equilibrium existence for discontinuous games when the standard tie-breaking rule is not sufficient to ensure it. Our paper characterizes when special tie-breaking rules are really needed. We accomplish this task for the set of symmetric auctions with unidimensional types and, partially, for a set of multidimensional symmetric auctions with weak monotonicity assumption.
When a special tie-breaking rule is needed, we show that the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule is sufficient to ensure equilibrium existence. This suggests that the all-pay auction (and the war of attrition) are better mechanisms to reveal information than the first-and second-price auctions.
Our results suggest that new concepts of games with not fully specified payoffs, as suggested by Simon and Zame (1990) and JSSZ, may not be necessary in general. Instead, we pursue the definition of exogenously defined tie-breaking rules that do not require communication of private information and guarantee equilibrium existence.
Appendix
For convenience, we follow the notation of section 5, but first we analyze auctions between two players with independent and uniformly distributed types in [0, 1] and satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. We allow for the existence of reserve prices that exclude bidders with types in [0, x 0 ) from the auction, that is, we relax Assumption 3 to Assumption 3' below.
LetS be the set of non-decreasing functionsb :
Note that x 0 = 0 when there is no exclusion. The interim payoff of a bidder with type x who bids β > b min and faces an opponent followingb ∈S is Π ³ x, β,b´=
α < x impliesb (α) 6 b min and the expression ofp ³ b min ,b´can be simplified to
14 We assume:
Note that Assumption 3'-(i) corresponds to the original Assumption 3. In Assumption 3'-(ii), x 0 is the type who bids the minimum bid b min . This type necessarily has zero expected payoff, because she must be indifferent between participating or not. The inequalities in Assumption 3'(ii) are weak monotonicity conditions that imply that types below x 0 do not have incentive to bid above b min since the object value is not greater than expected payments.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 2(i) holds. Letb ∈S be an equilibrium increasing in (x 0 , 1). Then, b is continuous on (x 0 , 1). Moreover, ifṽ is continuous in the second variable, thenb is differentiable in (x 0 , 1) and satisfies
Proof. The proof is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 2 in Maskin and Riley (1984) . It is available upon request to the authors.
Proposition 5 Assume thatṽ is continuous and Assumption 2-(ii) holds. Letb ∈S be an increasing equilibrium in (x 0 , 1). Then,b is continuous in (x 0 , 1) and
Proof. The proof is based on the proof of Theorem 3 of Maskin and Riley (1984) . It is also available upon request to the authors.
We have the following:
Lemma 7 Assume thatṽ is continuous. Letb ∈S be an increasing equilibrium in
Proof. Under Assumption 2-(i), Proposition 4 implies thatb is differentiable and, sinceb is increasing on
We also have thatṽ is continuous and p W and p L are differentiable.
Thus, one can easily see from (16) that
. Now let us consider cases whereb is not monotonic since this is exactly the setting of Theorem 3. To treat non-increasingb, we define the following:
Modified Auction. Fixb such thatb (x 0 ) = b min andb (y) > b min for y > x 0 . The bidder bids a type y ∈ [0, 1]. If y < x 0 , the payment is zero. If y ≥ x 0 , the payment is determined as if the bidder has submitted the bidb (y). The bidder wins against opponents who announce types below y and loses against who announce types above y. If there is a tie, the object is given to each bidder with probability 1/2.
Observe that ifb is increasing, the modified auction is the standard auction where all bidders followb. If b is not increasing, the difference is that the winning events are not determined byb but by the announced type y. The rule of the modified auction implies the following interim payoff:
We can simplify the above expression tô
Proposition 6 (Payment Rule) Assume thatṽ is continuous. If truth-telling is an equilibrium for the modified auction, thenp
Proof. In the case of Assumption 2-(i),b, p W and p L are differentiable on (x 0 , 1). Thus,p andΠ are also differentiable. So, for every y ∈ (x 0 , 1), we havê
The first-order condition for truth-telling optimality gives for x > x 0 , ∂ 2Π (x, y) | y=x = 0, which implies thatp
(α, α) dα for y > x 0 . Now, let us turn to Assumption 2-(ii). Sinceb is only continuous,p is not necessarily differentiable. Nevertheless, if y > x 0 , Now we turn to the equilibrium existence. We will not assume thatṽ is continuous. Instead, we assume only the validity of the payment expression (20) .
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium) Assume (20) . Then, truth-telling is an equilibrium of the modified auction if and only if
Proof. Given (20) , the optimity condition for truth-telling, namelyΠ
The other cases are similar.
As previously said, ifb is increasing, the modified auction is just the original (unmodified) auction. Thus, we have: Corollary 1 Assume thatb is increasing on (x 0 , 1) and implies (20) . Then,b is equilibrium of the auction e A if and only if (21) holds.
Observe that Proposition 7 and Corollary 1 do not requireṽ to be continuous.
Definition of the reparametrized auction
Fix b ∈ S. Define the map P b = P by (10) , that is,
P associates each type to the winning probability given b ∈ S. From the symmetry, P does not depend on i and P (t i ) S P (t j ) if and only if b (t i ) S b (t j ). Obviously, two players have the same probability of winning if and only if they choose the same bid. Thus,
where
The equality of these events and (10) imply that
This can be used as a definition of an admissible reparametrization, even if the bidding function b is not given. This and the fact that the range of P is [0, 1] imply
for all c ∈ [0, 1]. The above equation means that the distribution of
The c.d.f. of opponents' maximum bid,P , is given by (9) andb =P −1 . Since
If
The notation suggests thatΠ (x, c) is the interim payoff of e A. This is exactly the content of Proposition 8 below which justifies the interpretation of e A as the outcome-equivalent of A, mentioned in Section 5. Since we can prove the equality of the interim payoffs, there is no loss of generality to work with uniform distribution of (reparametrized) types on [0, 1].
Proposition 8
Consider an auction A satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 and e A defined above for a given P : S → [0, 1]. Following the previous notation, we have:
(ii) Suppose thatb is strictly increasing and satisfies the payment expression (20) . If, for all (x, y)
, thenb is an equilibrium of e A and b =b • P is an equilibrium of A. Proof. Let us introduce the following notation:
Let us start with the proof forΠ
. Denote the conditional expectation by
The event
Now we appeal to Lehmann (1959) , Lemma 2.2, p. 43. It says that if R is a transformation and µ
In our case,
∀j 6 = i} = c, by (23). So, µ * is exactly the Lebesgue measure, and
From this and the definition ofΠ + , we havẽ
where the second line comes from Fubbini's Theorem and the last results from independency and the definition ofṽ (φ, α) and g t i ,c (α) (see (11) and (28)). From the fact thatb = ³P b´− 1
, we can substituteP b to obtaiñ
Now, we can repeat the same procedures for Π − (φ, c) and obtaiñ
Adding up, we obtain the interim payoff of the indirect auctionΠ (φ, c) =Π
For the second part, taking conditional expectations (27) implies that
Thus, ifb is a strictly increasing function satisfying the payment expression (20) , Corollary 1 implies thatb is an equilibrium of e A. Now, we prove that Π (s, b (s)) ≥ Π (s, c), for all c, where b =b • P . This inequality is equivalent to Z {s−i∈S:b(sj )<b(s),∀j}
or, if y is such thatb (y) = c, Z
Sinceb satisfies (20) , when P (s) = x the above inequality can be written as
which is condition (27).
Proof of Proposition 3.
We need the following:
Lemma 8 (Payoff Characterization) Consider an auction A satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Fix b ∈ S. The bidder i's payoff can be expressed by
where ∂ b i Π(t i , β, b (·)) exists for almost all β with
If b ∈ S, it defines a reparametrization P b by (10) . The bid b (t i ) = β is optimal for bidder t i against the strategy b (·) of the opponents. Thus, ∂ b Π (s, b (s)) = 0 and Lemma 8 imply that
Observe that the right-hand side does not depend on s (it depends on it only through the optimum bid β = b (s)). Thus, the left-hand side has to be the same for all s that bid the same bid in equilibrium, which implies (14) .
Through the proof of Theorem 5, we will make successive use of the following:
Lemma 9 For any σ−field Ξ on S N −1 , we have
Proof. Assumption 5 gives the first equivalence. By Assumption 3, if v (s
Proof of Theorem 5. Equilibrium Existence. Let P be defined by (15) , x, y ∈ [0, 1] and s ∈ S be such that P (s) = x. We claim that Assumption 5 implies
Indeed, if x > y, for all t i and t 0 i such that P (t 0 i ) = x and P (t i ) = y, we have v (t
If P (s) = x < α < y, we havev (s, α) −ṽ (α, α) < 0 so that the same inequality is satisfied and the claim is proved. By Theorem 4,b is an equilibrium of e A and b =b • P is an equilibrium of A.
Now assume thatṽ is continuous. The sufficiency was already established. We now prove the necessity. Let b ∈ S be an equilibrium of A, P b (given by (10)) be its associate reparametrization andb
By Proposition 8,b is an equilibrium of e A. Lemma 10 x > y ⇒ V (x) ≥ V (y) . Proof. By absurd, suppose that there exist x and y, x > y, such that V (x) < V (y). First, we claim that for all t i and t
, a contradiction. Thus, the claim is proved.
This claim and Lemma 9 imply that
The fact thatb is an equilibrium of e A gives
Summing up these two integrals, we obtain
which contradicts Corollary 1. This contradiction establishes the result.
In fact, V (x) is strictly increasing:
Proof. Suppose that there exist x > y such that V (x) = V (y). Then, the monotonicity of V (by the previous lemma) gives
. However, from the definition ofb as the inverse ofP b , we have:
which is a contradiction.
Thus, we proved that
impliesv (s 0 ) =v (s). In other words, P b (s 0 ) S P b (s) if and only ifv (s 0 ) Sv (s) which allows us to conclude
as defined in (15) . In other words, the reparametrization is unique.
Uniqueness. In the previous step (necessity), we show that the reparametrization is unique, which implies thatṽ is unique. Ifṽ is continuous, Proposition 1 says that any equilibriumb satisfies the payment expression (1). If there is only oneb that satisfies such expression, then the equilibrium of e A is unique and, hence, of A.¥ Proof of Theorem 6. Ifb is strictly increasing, then b =b • P is an equilibrium of A, by Theorem 5. Thus, we need to show that an equilibrium exists ifb is not increasing. In the first part of the proof of Theorem 5, we established that Assumption 5 implies that
whenever x > y. It was also shown that
and thatΠ (P (t i ) , c) = Π (t i , c) for all t i and c, when the reparametrization is given by (15) . Let us define b (x) = sup α∈[0,x]b (α). As we discussed after the statement of Theorem 3, this is just one of the possible specification for the equilibrium bidding function. The only exception is when the tie includes the highest bidder. In such a case, it is mandatory that the bid of tying bidders follows the above definition. The reason will become clear in the sequel.
Remember thatb is absolutely continuous. Then, there is an enumerable set of intervals Figure 2) . Therefore, there is a tie among types in [a k , c k ] for the bidding function b. Let b k be the specified bid for types in
The tie is solved by an all-pay auction among tying bidders. The only information that bidders have for the second auction is that there is a tie in b k , that is,
By the definition of P in (15), P (−i) satisfies
Thus, in the tie-breaking auction the (direct) type t i of bidder i is competing against players t j in the set {s ∈ S : P (s) ∈ [a k , c k ]} and the equilibrium is to bid the increasing functioñ
Indeed, from (34), we have that
In the whole auction, the bidder with indirect type x ∈ [a k , c k ] who follows the strategy
in the case of a tie has the expected payoff
We claim that deviation in the second auction is suboptimal. By deviating from b but bidding in the range of b, that is, bidding b (y) 6 = b (x), yields
when b (y) is not a bid with positive probability. This is lower or equal toΠ i ¡ x, b (x) ¢ by (34). If b (y) is a bid with positive probability, the second stage will be again an all-pay auction and the bidder cannot improve his payoff, again by (34).
If x bids β < inf x∈[0,1] b (x), then his payoff will be 
Example 4 (proofs)
We provide conditions on α(x), satisfied by the function specified in Example 4, such that there is a U-shaped equilibrium. In this case, there are two pooling types, that is, types which bid the same for each equilibrium bid. Thus, the pooling type of t, ϕ = ϕ(t), in a symmetric equilibrium b ∈ S satisfies the condition of Proposition 3:
t + α(t)E[t 2 |b(t) = b(t 2 )] = ϕ + α(ϕ)E[t 2 |b(t) = b(t 2 )].
Since E[t 2 |b(t) = b(t 2 )] = (t + ϕ)/2 and because of the symmetry and the uniform distribution, then ϕ is the implicit solution of (t + ϕ)(α(ϕ) − α(t)) = 2(t − ϕ).
The function α(x) defined in Example 4 satisfies the conditions of the following claim which establishes the existence of a symmetric U-shaped equilibrium.
Claim. Suppose that: (i) α is differentiable, decreasing and convex such that α(0) − α(1) = 2 and (ii) α 0 is convex and α 0 (x) ≥ −1/x, for all x ∈ (0, 1]. Then there exists a U-shaped symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Define the following reparametrization:
It is easy to see that P is decreasing. Define The implicit derivative of ϕ with respect to t is ϕ 0 (t) = α(t) − α(ϕ (t)) + (t + ϕ (t))α 0 (t) + 2 α(ϕ (t)) − α(t) + (t + ϕ (t))α 0 (ϕ) + 2 .
Without loss of generality (because ϕ • ϕ(t) = t), we can assume that the denominator is negative and ϕ > t. Thus,
Since α 0 is a convex function, the above inequality holds if
where the last equality comes from the implicit definition of ϕ. However, this inequality is true because α 0 (x) ≥ −1/x, for all x ∈ (0, 1]. ¥
